Eating Soup with a Spoon: The U.S. Army as a  Learning Organization  in the Vietnam War by Daddis, Gregory A.
Chapman University
Chapman University Digital Commons
History Faculty Articles and Research History
1-2013
Eating Soup with a Spoon: The U.S. Army as a
"Learning Organization" in the Vietnam War
Gregory A. Daddis
Chapman University, daddis@chapman.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/history_articles
Part of the Asian History Commons, Cultural History Commons, Military History Commons,
Other History Commons, Political History Commons, Public History Commons, Social History
Commons, and the United States History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
History Faculty Articles and Research by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daddis, Gregory A. “Eating Soup with a Spoon: The U.S. Army as a ‘Learning Organization’ in the Vietnam War,” Journal of Military
History 77, no. 1 ( January 2013): 229-254.
Eating Soup with a Spoon: The U.S. Army as a "Learning Organization" in
the Vietnam War
Comments
This article was originally published in Journal of Military History, volume 77, issue 1, in 2013.
Copyright
Society for Military History
This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/history_articles/59
Abstract 
Standard Vietnam War narratives often argue that the U.S. lost 
the war because it failed to learn and adapt to the conditions of an un-
conventional conflict. Based on a reappraisal of learning processes 
rather than on the outcome of the war, this essay argues that as an 
organization, the U.S. Army did learn and adapt in Vietnam; however, 
that learning was not sufficient, in itself, to preserve a South Vietnam 
in the throes of a powerful nationalist A reexamination of 
the Army's strategic approach, operational experiences, and orga-
nizational changes reveals that significant learning did occur 
the Vietnam War despite the conflict's final result. 
Introduction 
One of the dominant narratives of the Vietnam War in the last 
has centered on the argument that the U.S. Army, often broadly defined, lost the 
war because it failed to learn and adapt to the conditions of an unconventional 
conflict. In fact, denunciations of the willingness to learn appeared even 
before the final collapse of South Vietnam in 1975. Critics to a system 
which rewarded those who "practiced conformity ... and encouraged officers to 
Gregory A. Daddis, a U.S. Army colonel, holds a Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill and is an Academy Professor in the Department of History, United States 
Academy, West Point, New York. A veteran of Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, he 
has served as the command historian for the Multi-National Corps-Iraq in Baghdad. His books 
include Fighting in the Great Crusade: An 8th Irif(mtryArtillery Officer in World Uizr II (2002) and 
No Sure Victory: Measuring US. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam U0r (2011). 
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hide mistakes" and to a service culture riven 1 Postwar """""""'_,..,,.,,H. 
0 ,.,.,,.,,.,,1-i,,.r1 ~ui•-~iu, followed suit. One commentator 
to understand the need for 
-'"'-"''"""iuiii,__, become that it even "ignored 
that came from within."2 
Influential histories of the war seemed to reinforce such In 
America in maintained that the U.S. 
attrition while of population 
1he arguing that the 
because it never realized that warfare required basic changes 
in methods to meet the exigencies of this 'new' conflict environment."3 This 
narrative of unsuccessful became fashionable with of 
well-received a cautionary tale linking 
For won in because it was a 
lost in Vietnam because it was not. "The 
averred, "resisted any true attempt to learn how to 
an insurgency the course of the Vietnam preferring to treat the war as a 
conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War and World War II."4 
Some Lewis contend that the did learn, 
ieaae1~sn1p of Creighton who took command of the 
Assistance Vietnam in mid-1968.5 
~u·J~,;;.;i, standard historiography of the war offers somewhat of a false -~-.~~~· __ ,,,, 
Either the U.S. failed in Vietnam because it refused to learn and adapt, or 
it did learn and succeeded militarily, to have the fruits of victory traded away 
m This essay offers the more nuanced that while 
much of the proved capable ofleaming and adapting throughout its time in 
too often factors outside of the Army's influence vitiated its efforts. In 
the fact that the U.S. in Vietnam fails to prove that it did not learn. 
1. Edward L. King, 7he Death of7he Army: A Pre-Mortem (New York: Review 
Press, 75. William R. Corson, of Failure (New York: W.W. Norton &Com-
pany, Inc., 100-101. 
2. Cincinnatus, of the United States Army dur-
ing the Vietnam Era (New York: W.W. Norton 1981), 9-10. 
3. Guenter in Vietnam (New York: Oxford Un1vers11ty Press, 1978), 82-85. 
Andrew F. and Vietnam (Baltimore, Md.: Johns 
Press, 1986), 259. 
A. to Eat Soup with a 
'-''-JLH.A>.iev. University of Chicago Press, 2002), xxii. 
uv_u.._. 1,,L., Better Vl!ar: 7he Unexamined Victories and Final Last 
Years in Vietnam York: Harcourt Brace & 1999). Sorley more recently has ar-
gued that Gen. Westmoreland, Abrams's predecessor, failed to learn (or at least "it is not clear 
what he learned") during his tenure as COMUSMACV; Sorley, Westmoreland: The General Who 
Lost Vietnam (Boston and New York: Houghton Miffiin Harcourt, 2011), 117. 
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As an organization, the U.S did learn and in that 
learning was not sufficient in itself for securing victory. focusing on the process 
of learning, rather than on the war's outcome, this article examines elements of 
American strategy, operational innovations, and organizational change to suggest 
that American defeat in Vietnam cannot be explained by reluctance, even resistance, 
to learning about the complexities of unconventional warfare. 
.Pnrn1·nu in Vietnam 
Crucial to any assessment of military learning is comprehending how armies 
draw conclusions from their own experiences and those of others, particularly 
the enemy, while engaged in combat. Organizational learning theorists caution 
that it is individuals acting as agents of organizations, rather than organizations 
themselves, who learn. Certainly, institutions establish systems which either 
facilitate or impede the learning process. Organizational culture, biases, and 
rewards all shape the practice of learning. Individuals, however, frame problems, 
design solutions, and act to solve problems.6 This seemingly small point can 
illuminate studies of the U.S. Army in Vietnam. Changes in doctrine, alterations 
to organizational structure, and modifications to the employment of force all took 
place in a dynamic wartime environment which changed over time and varied 
widely from province to province. Charges that the Army failed as a "learning 
organization" often underrate the mosaic nature of Vietnam while overvaluing 
the influence of a constraining organizational culture. 
Acknowledging this caveat, Harvard Business School's David A. Garvin 
usefully defines a learning organization as one "skilled at creating, acquiring, 
interpreting, transferring, and retaining knowledge, and at purposefully modifying 
its behavior to reflect new knowledge and insights."7 Garvin's characterization 
implies a dual process of intellectual growth and behavioral change. In assessing 
the U.S. Army in Vietnam, one thus must observe not only patterns oflearning 
but also adaptation on the battlefield. In this sense, adaptation is a manifestation 
of learning and suggests that learning may be meaningless, at least in war, unless 
it is demonstrated in practice. Of course, not all organizational change stems from 
learning. 8 All armies at war respond to stimuli, both internal and external, and 
such responses can be divorced from a formal learning process. To evaluate if an 
6. Chris Argyris, On (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993), 8, 123. 
Bo Hedberg, "How organizations learn and unlearn," in Handbook of Organizational Design, vol. 
1, to their environments, ed. Paul C. Nystrom and William H. Starbuck 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 6. 
7. David A. Garvin, in Action: A Guide to the to 
Work (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2000), 11. In terms of gaining and retaining 
knowledge, it is important to note that Nagl argues that the "had neither the knowledge 
nor the desire to change its orientation away from conventional wars"; Nagl, to Eat 
Soup with a Knife, 126. 
8. Jack S. Levy, "Learning and foreign policy: sweeping a conceptual minefield," Interna-
tional 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 288. 
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army is nowt'.ver. it seems necessary to evaluate the between 
intellectual processes and the innovations or adaptations produced the 
addition of new knowledge.9 
many of MACV's officers imperfectly made such linkages. 
Historians like Krepinevich and Loren Baritz highlight culture's role 
u.au.-.,.uu.iu,,ui; the connections between learning and progress, arguing that 
of counterinsurgency stemmed from institutional rigidity and an 
on!arnz:ltl<)n<U desire to fight conventional warfare in Europe. One former U.S. 
officer even has maintained that the average American soldier was "not well 
suited" for in Vietnam since it was "not in keeping with the 
"
10 Arguing, however, that culture limited learning 
to such a as to cause failure appears exaggerated. Surely Army culture in 
the 1960s produced biases and predispositions in officers already inclined 
to conventional warfare based on their organization's recent history in Korea and 
World War II. Yet even if military organizations learn within existing intellectual 
constructs, cultures can and do change. Hardly does an organizational, or even 
national, culture determine policies as other variables, especially in wartime, 
are at 11 Recent scholarship even indicates that the explanatory power 
of culture diminishes for armies actively involved in war.12 
Further complicating any analysis of Army learning in Vietnam is the war's 
outcome. Ignoring Clausewitz's warning against making "judgment by " 
cnt1c N agl assessed organizational learning in Vietnam from 1965 to 1972 
asking the question "Did the U.S. Army develop a successful counterinsurgency 
doctrine in Vietnam?"13 Such outcome-based analysis fails to acknowledge the 
possibility that the could learn and still lose. In equating learning with 
also discounted the prospect that both the regular North Vietnamese 
9. Dima discusses the linkages between the nature of military organizations and 
the innovation produced in 7he Culture of Military Innovation: 7he Impact of Cultural Factors on 
the Recuolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel (Stanford, Calif: Stanford Security 
Studies, 2010), 7. 
10. Adrian R. Lewis, 7he American Culture of U!ar: 7he History of US. Military Force from World 
Ular II to (New York: Routledge, 2007), 225. Loren Baritz, Baclifire:A His-
/1n\cPrz.ran Culture Led us into Vietnam and Made us Fight the Uizy We Did (Baltimore, 
Hopkins University Press, 1985),233. Krepinevich, 7heArmy and Vietnam, 5. 
11. Richard Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation: From Vietnam to 
(London: Routledge, 2006), 8. See also Henry Mintzberg and Frances Westley, "Cycles of 
>rg:amzat10n.al Change," Strategic 13 (Winter 1992): 40. On military or-
ganizations learning within their own cultures, see Brian M. Linn, 7he Echo of Battle: 7he Army's 
Uizy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
12. Patrick Porter, Military Orienta/ism: Eastern War 7hrough Western Eyes (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 2009), 15-16. 
13. Nagl, to Eat Soup with a Knife, 174. Carl von Clausewitz, On Uizr, ed. and 
trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Everyman's Library, 1976, 
1993), 194. 
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and the largely unconventional forces of the National Liberation 
might have learned at a faster rate throughout the war than their 
American adversaries. In this sense, Garvin's definition oflearning organizations is 
significant. Process matters. Acquiring, interpreting, and transferring knowledge, 
as well as modifying behavior, constitute a progression of actions that cannot be 
explained only by an organization's end state. 
Setting aside the issue of defeat or victory in Vietnam, the U.S. 
process oflearning in the years following World War II illustrated an organization 
committed to altering routines and practices based on the experience of combat. 
In 1951, soon after the Chinese entered the Korean the Army's Office of 
the Chief of Information distributed a series of pamphlets titled Army Troop 
Ieformation Discussion Topics. That same year the Army staff published a special 
regulation, Processing of Combat Ieformation, which systematized procedures for 
capturing and institutionalizing combat lessons from Korea. The Army's Assistant 
Chief of Staff, G3, now responsible for compiling training and operational lessons, 
oversaw the implementation of "lessons learned" from the front lines into training 
programs throughout the service. This coordinated, and fairly comprehensive, 
reporting and processing system sought to improve combat effectiveness by candidly 
sharing the experiences of veterans. As General John R. Hodge commented in the 
introduction of the March 1953 issue of Combat Information, "lessons learned" 
bulletins brought out "some of the more important deficiencies in our infantry 
operations in Korea."14 
The Army's headquarters codified this process of recognizing challenges and 
confronting them with institutional learning in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
In 1959, Army Regulation (AR) 525-24, Combat Operations-Command Report, 
established guidelines for the "rapid and effective collection, evaluation, and 
application of specific lessons learned in combat operations."15 One year later AR 
525-60 prescribed explicit procedures for the processing of combat operations. By 
May 1966, six months after American soldiers first grappled with NVA regulars in 
South Vietnam's Ia Drang Valley, the Department of the Army had established a 
foundation for organizational learning which would remain in place for the remainder 
of the Vietnam War. AR 1-19, Operational Reports-Lessons Learned, instituted a 
"system for the collection, recording, evaluation, and appropriate corrective action 
for operational requirements contained in operational reports."16 These OR/LLs 
14. Hodge quoted in Dennis J. Veto ck, Lessons Learned· A History of US Army Lesson Learn-
ing (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army Military History Institute, 1988), 85; on Korean War "les-
sons learned" processes, see 79-86. On changes in organizational routines and practices, see M. 
Leann Brown, Michael Kenney, and Michael Zarkin, eds., Organizational Learning in the Global 
Context (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2006), 4. 
15. Department of the Army, AR 525-24, Combat Operations-Combat Report, Washing-
ton, D.C., 29 October 1959. 
16. Department of the Army, AR 525-60, Combat Operations: Processing of Combat Informa-
tion, Washington, D.C., 17February1960 and AR 1-19, Operational Reports-Lessons Learned, 
26 May 1966. Ronald H. Spector notes that the "lessons learned" process was an imperfect one 
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constituted a 
intellectual 
South Assistance ~'""''"'~,,,~, 
time in a process for collecting and combat lessons. 
Formed on 8 MACV issued its first "lessons learned" report on 
30 an account of Heliborne Cai in An Xuyen province. 
A stream of reports soon followed. The MACV staff shared knowledge on 
auuJL'-'"J'"""' "clear and hold" operations, and resources 
the VC infrastructure. Both the and 
processes indicate that an feedback 
commanders and their units to from the combat experiences 
of others. The content of these reports certainly was important, but so too was 
the process itself. Rather than rejecting new ideas about fighting in an 
unconventional environment, many commanders purposefully shared evaluations 
of their unit's performance in combat. Brigadier General Ellis W. Williamson of 
the 173rd Airborne Brigade believed that his recurring Commander's Combat Note 
encouraged his officers and soldiers "to continue those things that were proven to 
be and to avoid repeating our mistakes."18 
Williamson's emphasis on interpreting, sharing, and then applying new 
information that MACV's commanders learned both inductively and 
As seen many U.S. officers underwent a deductive 
process, studying broad conceptual ideas on counterinsurgency and 
unconventional warfare and then attempting to apply those lessons on the political 
and battlefields of Vietnam. Officers like Williamson also made use of 
inductive learning skills. Gathering new knowledge by observation and experience, 
these "reflective practitioners" actively sought to improve their effectiveness by 
"'V",,,....,.~,..11 nrr their understanding of the war through doctrinal revisions, through 
articles, and in the OR/LLs themselves.19 
Of course, inductive learning in Vietnam could be exceedingly difficult. 
Commanders faced numerous problems in assessing the impact of their operations. 
The results of their efforts were not always visible. Unit commanders like General 
at best. "Those commanders who had the time or inclination to read such publications were 
perfectly free to disregard them"; Spector, After Tet: 1he Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New 
York: Free Press, 1993), 218. 
17. Lessons learned index in Headquarters, United States Assistance Command, 
Vietnam "Combat Experiences 5-69," 6 January 1970, p. 11-8, U.S. Army Military 
Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. (hereafter cited as MHI). 
18. Williamson quoted in Vetock, Lessons Learned, 106. Certainly, it might be suggested 
that this was a self-fulfilling prophecy. Williamson wrote the commander's notes, so he was pre-
to viewing them as useful. On the importance of both content and process, see W. War-
ner Burke, Change: 1heory and Practice (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage, 2002), 14. 
19. Reflective practitioners in Leon de Caluwe and Hans Vermaak, to Change: A 
Jrv1111z.zatwn Change Agents (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2003), 267. On inductive 
versus deductive learning, see Mintzberg and of Organizational Change," 41. 
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Williamson to sustain proven but the of 
-i-.~"'"·~~ in Vietnam often a true assessment of what worked well in 
of When the 173rd launched 
effectiveness. as an ~'"'~~ 1 = 
Vietnamese government had wrested IJVUU~~" 
The 173rd Airborne 
instructive for gaining insights into 
Vietnam. The unit's three-fold mission mu~~D•0 +-0 
in 
commanders in MACV 
understood the multifaceted nature of a conflict that was a 
revolutionary, international, conventional, and guerrilla war. MAC V's · .. ·'' ... _, ....... . 
1965 directive on the employment ofU.S. forces in Vietnam specified that the "war 
in Vietnam is a political as well as war. It is because the ultimate 
goal is to regain the and cooperation of the and to create conditions 
which permit the to go about their normal lives in peace and 
Without question, officers and soldiers oftentimes imperfectly 
their newly acquired knowledge in such a complex environment. 
To argue, however, as does Nagl, that the U.S. failed to learn in Vietnam 
depreciates the ways in which reflective to the demands of 
unconventional war in Southeast Asia. 
did not prevent learning about unconventional war. 
Confronting L'o:uniteri~nsi~1rv·em7v 
A basic pillar of the Vietnam War's is the contention that the 
U.S. Army only poorly understood, if not consciously resisted, counterinsurgency 
in the early 1960s. Despite the newly inaugurated John F. . ,,.,_u,,~A• 
emphasis on political and social reform as key elements in insurgencies, 
a culturally constrained army, so goes the argument, remained wedded to viewing 
unconventional warfare through a very conventional lens. While offering an 
20. Operation New Life in John M. Carland, the 1965 to October 1966 
(Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2000), 92-93. On problems evaluaLting 
data, see Burke, 16; and Garvin, in Action, 23. On the more 
general problem of assessing American operations in Vietnam, see Gregory A. Daddis, No Sure 
11/1,./'°,,..,.,,.,. U.S. Army Ejfecti'7.1eness and Progress in the Vietnam War (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2011). 
21. Headquarters, MACV, Directive Number 525-4, "Tactics and Techniques for Employ-
ment of US Forces in the Republic of Vietnam," 17 September 1965, In-Country Publications 
Folder, Historian's Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. 
(hereafter cited as CMH). On the multifaceted nature of the war, see Mark Philip Bradley, Viet-
nam at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 2. 
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i'-'LHai.u, such a does 
which considered insurgent threats in 
the intellectual aspects of warfare in the age 
of national liberation did not escape the officer corps. While one needs to 
take care when of the "officer as a single entity, evidence suggests 
many officers realized that both atomic weaponry and decolonization in the wake 
of World War II were an impact on the conduct of war. Without question, 
the U.S. made an enormous intellectual and materiel investment in limited 
uuvu"'"'JU-L the 1950s. Yet this focus, one officer writing in 
1v1.u1t,rJr1; Review surmised that the "tactics oflimited war" 
in future conflicts.22 
~r'",_,,.., 0•·=,, warfare and the Chinese civil war further 
influenced of armed conflict in the post-World War II 
era. One lieutenant colonel thoughtfully outlined the relationship between communist 
and the need the local civilian population. 
"""V""'"'""'"~''"' in Indochina, the colonel highlighted how "peaceful 
could become "guerrillas ... under the cover of darkness."23 
in an award-winning article, found "no apparent distinction of any 
s1g:mttca11ce ... in Communist military thought between a political struggle and 
'~'T"""'"~~ the smell of gunpowder."24 If some officers were reluctant to study any 
,..,,..,,i,.,_,,...,, t-h'""'rh+ which departed from conventional operations-and certainly, some 
were-many others a keen appreciation for the complexities of warfare in 
the first decades of the Cold War era. 
A review not but also of the Army's doctrine and 
its education system, indicates that many among the officer corps were 
neither seduced the prospects of nor culturally constrained by their preference 
for conventional war in Counterinsurgency, especially after 1960, became 
a of study and debate. Officers deliberated the paramilitary, political, 
and civic actions required to defeat a subversive insurgency.25 They reflected on 
how best to coordinate military and non-military measures when committed to a 
rr.11H1f-p~·1n•C0111"0-P•nr·u effort. As one lieutenant colonel argued, "political, sociological, 
and economic measures which we may take to counter insurgency will prove only 
to be sterile efforts if they are conducted from a position of military weakness and 
within an inadequate security base."26 Clearly not all officers subscribed to the ideas 
22. Robert K. Cunningham, "The Nature of War," Military Review 39, no. 8 (November 
1959): 56. On the and limited war, see Christopher M. Gacek, 1he Logic if Force: 1he Dilem-
ma U1ar in American Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 138. 
B. Jordan, "Objectives and Methods of Communist Guerrilla Warfare," Mili-
tary Review 39, no. 10 1960): 54. 
24. Carl M. Guezlo, "The Communist Long War," Military Review 40, no. 9 (December 
1960): 22. 
25. Jonathan F. Ladd, "Some Reflections on Counterinsurgency," Military Review 44, no. 
10 (October 1964): 73. 
26. Gustav]. Gillert, Jr., "Counterinsurgency," Military Review 45, no. 4 (April 1965): 29. 
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of unconventional warfare-one believed the counte1~1nsu1r12:e:nc:v mission should 
be given to the Marine Corps-but enough seriously pondered such 
theories to raise questions about the Army's disinterest in about 
new and unfamiliar concepts.27 
Doctrinal concepts mirrored the complexities being discussed in the 
professional journals. Though Army field manuals often conflated terms like 
insurgent, guerrilla, and irregular forces, a continual revision process LH'~"L""'·'V"-<L 
the 19 5 Os and mid-1960s ensured that the theoretical underpinnings of 
unconventional remained current. Field Manual 31-21, Guerrilla 
declared in 1955 that for anti-guerrilla actions to be suc:ce~'snu, 
"should be based on a detailed of the country, national characteristics, the 
customs, beliefs, cares, hopes, and desires of the people."28 In early doctrine 
introduced terms such as "ideological bases of resistance" and "civic action'' to its 
readers. The February 1963 version of FM Counterguerrilla Uil1Pru•twnc 
noted that "counterguerrilla warfare is a contest of imagination, ingenuity, and 
improvisation by the opposing commanders."29 The manual likewise counseled 
that "conventional intelligence techniques must be adapted to the situation and 
tailored to exploit the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of the 
area of operations and enemy being encountered."30 
While Army doctrine alluded to the importance of learning and intellectual 
adaptability, field manuals advocated a holistic approach to the problems of countering 
internal subversion and insurgencies. The 1963 version of FM 31-16 warned against 
operations focused solely on enemy combat units. Effective counterinsurgency operations 
also required "appropriate action against the civilian and underground support of the 
guerrilla force, without which it cannot operate."31 Thus, FM 31-16 spent considerable 
time on issues of population control, civil improvement, and the use of existing police 
forces and intelligence nets. Importantly, both the 1963 version of FM 31-16, and its 
March 1967 revision, discussed the importance of an integrated training approach to 
prepare for the complexities of countering insurgencies.As the revised manual perceptively 
argued, such operations "normally are long-term with a complicated interplay of tactical 
operations, populace and resources control operations, and concurrent psychological, 
intelligence, and advisory assistance operations, and military civic action."32 
27. On the U.S. Marine Corps taking over counterinsurgency, see Walter Darnell 
"This Matter of Counterinsurgency," Military Review 44, no.10(October1964): 85. 
28. Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-21, Guerrilla U1aifare, Washington, D.C., 
May 1955, 53. The manual also stressed the importance of synchronizing efforts among various 
governmental agencies. 
29. Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-15, Operations Against Forces, 
Washington, D.C., May 1961, 4, 18, 25; FM 31-16, February 1963, 2. 
30. Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-16, Operations, Washing-
ton, D.C., February 1963, 94. 
31. Ibid., 20. 
32. Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-16, Operations, Washing-
ton, D.C., March 1967, 147. 
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the 
pace. In 
Fort Leavenworth established a 
revised its curriculum to 
1960 academic year, CGSC students 
on unconventional warfare the 
instruction had increased to 222 
waited until 1962 to 
school followed 
aeve1_otJ1m1::nt if at a somewhat slower 
General Staff at 
of Unconventional Warfare and 
the 1959-
,.--,,-a.,--,--.--,-,-~,~~ r,r.nnt-ic.r1nc11 rrrPr\rU lessons into curricula. Vietnam veterans as 
modified small arms instruction to better prepare soldiers 
cuu.uu."H'-·"'· and 1965 the School had constructed two mock 
South Vietnamese villages for instructional use. 34 That year, the Armor School's 
Officer Candidate Course at Fort Knox was using Bernard Fall's The Two 
Tanham's Communist and Truong Chinh's Primer 
Revolt in its insurgency lessons.35 
.L/',"l-J'.lL" their responsibilities to master conventional fighting on a potentially 
ba1:tle:new, officers increasingly accepted unconventional warfare into their 
~~~ULH•~· educational venues, and professional journals. Even at commissioning 
institutions like the United States Academy, unconventional warfare 
became of the curriculum. West Point Superintendent William C. 
V\Testmoreland established a Counterinsurgency Training Committee in April 
1962 and instituted mandatory counterinsurgency training for all cadets. The 
Counterinsurgency Committee found that the "interdisciplinary 
nature" of the subject required cadets to study the "political, military, economic, 
and sociological aspects" of unconventional conflict. 36 Cadets 
studied the theoretical works of Mao Tse-tung and Vo Nguyen Giap while 
""""'J-'-VLH.Li":. the histories of revolutionary struggles in the Philippines, and 
33. On CGSC course subjects in the 1959-1960 school year, see "Summary of the 1959-
1960 Command and General Staff Officer Course," Special Collections, Combined 
Arms Research Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. On 1969 course hours, see Boyd L. Dastrup, 
1he Command and General Stqj[College:A (Manhattan, Kans.: Sun-
flower Press, 1982), 111.There were over 1,100 hours in the total CGSC curriculum. 
34. Andrew J. Birtle, US. Army Counterinsurgency and Operations Doctrine, 
1942-1976 U.S. Center History, 2006), 264-65. 
35. "Increased Emphasis-Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare Instruction," 
Armor 73, no. 1 1964): 58. Program oflnstruction (POI) for Associate Ar-
mor Officer Career Course, 1964, and POI for Branch Immaterial, Officer Candidate 
Course, 29 September 1965, in Special Collections, U.S. Army Armor School Library, Fort 
Knox, n.LHLl-<'-'-'-Y· 
36. Michael S. Davison, "Report of Counterinsurgency Committee," 19 June 1963, Training 
Unerat1011s Files (Counterinsurgency Committee), Special Collections, Jefferson Library, United 
Point, New York. Cadet training in Samuel Zaffiri, U!estmoreland·A 
bzorrrat>/Jv of General William C. U!estmoreland (New York: William Morrow, 1994), 96. 
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Indochina. Westmoreland himself would visit to in Vietnarr 
as MACV's deputy commander in 1964 in an effort, he recalled, to "learn from ar: 
earlier pacification experience."37 
The implementation of this knowledge undeniably met with limited success ir: 
South Vietnam. Americans in a foreign land struggled when applying conventiona: 
tactics which often were irrelevant or even counterproductive. Both doctrine anc 
OR/LL reports continued to emphasize hard-hitting military operations anc 
maintaining the initiative against the guerrilla. One battalion "lessons learned' 
report argued that the "old slogan 'Find 'Em-Fix 'Em-Fight 'Em and Finisr 
'Em!' is as true today as it was the first time it was spoken."38 These evocatiorn 
of conventional warfare gave ammunition to critics who, oblivious to 
efforts at learning, railed against the aggressiveness "of the American characte1 
which gave added impetus to their impatience and impulse." Journalist France~ 
Fitzgerald, highlighting the cultural aspects of the war, likened American Gls tc 
an "Orwellian Army [which J knew everything about military tactics, but nothin~ 
about where they were or who the enemy was."39 Several officers even contendec 
that successful training programs need only focus on adaptation to fighting in 2 
jungle environment.40 
Despite some officers' narrow conceptions of how best to counter political-
military insurgencies, to argue, as does General Dave R. Palmer, that "man) 
professional officers did not even recognize the term 'counter-insurgency"' ignore~ 
the many who did.41 Learning within the officer corps did occur. Professional~ 
did conceive of counterinsurgency as something more than just a military affai1 
for soldiers.42 The Army's doctrine on unconventional warfare recognized the 
importance of political, economic, and social aspects. Europe may have remainec 
the preferred theater of conflict within the larger Cold War context-and arguabl) 
the most dangerous-yet the Army's officer corps earnestly wrestled with th( 
37. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976) 
82. Westmoreland recalled, rightly so, that ''Although it was an enlightening visit, so many wen 
the differences between the two situations that we could borrow little outright from the Britisl-
experience." Cadet studies in Birtle, US. Army and Operation 
Doctrine, 26 l. 
38. Battalion report quoted in Headquarters, Department of the Pamphlet No. 350-
15-9, Operations-Lessons Learned, 1April1968, p. 32, MHI. 
39. Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake: 1he Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam (Bos· 
ton: Little, Brown, 1972), 370. American character in Robert Thompson, No Vietnan 
(New York: David McKay, 1969), 126. 
40. Ron Milam, Not a Gentleman's War: An Inside View Officers in the Vietnam Wa; 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 95. 
41. Dave Richard Palmer, Summons of the US.-Victnam in Perspective (San Rafael 
Calif: Presidio Press, 1978), 24. 
42. William Colby saw "the basic American misconception of the war as an affair for sol-
diers on both sides, rather than a political attack by the Communists, supported by militar) 
forces." Colby with James McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Yea; 
Im.1oluement in Vietnam (Chicago and New York: Contemporary Books, 1989), 184. 
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co1irntermsuri2:er1cy. Far from wedded to conventional 
'-~'"'-''IJLV, many serving officers willingly pondered, debated, and learned about 
how best to their to war in an unconventional setting. It was a 
,_,~ •• ~ •. L._., that would be replicated in South Vietnam as MACV's senior military 
commander a campaign strategy for a new kind of war. 
.Pn'.rn1no- and the 
is the ubiquitous and pejorative label for American strategy 
in Vietnam. Critics of the war maintain that as the U.S. prosecuted its 
,.....,,-nnr11 n·n in South Vietnam, it a flawed strategy of attrition, 
'-~·"'-'~ii,., ...... "...,'"'' at the expense of all other missions, on killing enemy soldiers. Such 
narratives argue that General William C. Westmoreland, MACV's commander 
from 1964 to 1968, focused on the "traditional attack mission of the infantry-
to find, fight and destroy enemy forces."43 Hypnotized the prospects of high 
counts and seduced by visions of decisive battlefield victories, officers like 
Westmoreland led the Army to failure because they failed to better employ a 
counterinsurgency strategy. Instead, they opted for attrition and in the process 
squandered their chances for victory. 
Alluring as such arguments are, they fail to consider Westmoreland's own views 
on "the importance of the people deciding which side they wanted to support." Even 
in the wake of the Ia Drang battle in late 1965, MACV' s commander concluded that 
the "most significant development" of the war would be the Vietnamese population 
supporting the Saigon government.44 Hardly wedded to a so-called Army concept 
which saw the application of firepower as the surest path to victory, Westmoreland 
spoke on of civic action, food distribution, and medical care as the central 
feature of operations designed to restore governmental control to former VC areas.45 
grounded in conventional operations with service in World War II and the 
Korean War, Westmoreland, much like the Army from which he came, accepted the 
idea that opposing revolutionary wars of national liberation in the late 1950s and 
1960s required more than just military power. 
criticisms of American strategy in Vietnam are not groundless. 
According to a 197 4 survey of general officers, more than one-third of respondents 
•i"'~~-"· U.S. objectives in Vietnam were "rather fuzzy" and "needed rethinking 
as the war progressed." The Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to develop a coherent 
in Vietnam, 46. For other traditional narratives on a strategy of attrition, 
see C. Herring, Americas Longest Wtir: 1he United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 4th ed. 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, 2002), 179; and Robert D. Schulzinger,A Time.for Wtir: 1he 
United S'tates and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 182. 
44. General Westmoreland's History Notes, 31 December 1965, in 1he Wtir in Vietnam: 1he 
if William C. Westmoreland, ed. Robert E. Lester (Bethesda, Md.: University Publications 
of America, 1993), text-fiche, Reel 6, Folder 3, 27 Dec 65-1 Jan 66. 
45. Gen. Westmoreland to Gen. Wheeler, cable, 11 November 1965, Pacification Folder, 
Box 4, Paul L. Miles Papers, MHI. 
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plan for Vietnam that fit within 
a larger national grand strategy, 
leaving Westmoreland, according 
to one senior American officer, "to 
invent his own strategic concept."46 
Furthermore, the MACV strategy 
aimed to accomplish lofty 
The U.S. Commander in Chief, 
Pacific directed 
Westmoreland to achieve the 
daunting political-military objective 
of a "stable and independent 
noncommunist government" in 
South Vietnam.47 (Nearly a decade 
of war would demonstrate the 
incapacity of American military 
might to achieve such a goal.) 
To accomplish such a broad 
mission, Westmoreland necessarily 
developed an all-encompassing 
concept of operations that sought 
not only to destroy enemy forces 
but also to expand the percentage of 
South Vietnam's population under 
the Saigon government's control. 
In early 1965, this appeared 
1he US. in the Vietnam Ufclr 
General William C. Westmoreland, 210ez)reJno1;r 
1967, Vietnam [ARC #530616, 
Johnson Library, Austin, Texas] 
a formidable-some officials worried an unachievable-task. Most American 
estimates of the situation inside South Vietnam painted a grim picture. Political 
instability wracked the Saigon government. NLF insurgents posed both a political 
and military threat in the countryside and increasingly demonstrated a willingness 
to confront South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) units in battle. Political subversion, 
assassination of government officials, and attacks on infrastructure continued at an 
alarming rate. Equally grave, American intelligence picked up indications 
of regular units from North Vietnam infiltrating into the south.48 
Westmoreland, believing the American advisory effort had done all it could to 
46. Bruce Palmer,Jr., quoted in 7he Second Indochina ef a Held at 
Airlie, Virginia, 7-9 November 1984, ed. John Schlight (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Mili-
tary History, 1986), 155. Survey data in Douglas Kinnard, 1he War Managers: American Generals 
Reflect on Vietnam (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1977; New York: DaCapo 
Press, 1991), 24. 
47. 1he Pentagon Papers: 1he Defense Department History if United States zn 
Vietnam, Senator Gravel ed., 5 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971-1972), 4:300. 
48. Westmoreland to Joint Chiefs of Staff, telegram, 7 June 1965, in U.S. Department of 
State, Foreign Relations if the United States, 1964-1968, 34 vols. (Washington: U.S. Government 
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the Saigon recommended the introduction of 
On 26 June 1965, the B. administration 
authorized MACV "to commit U.S. ground forces anywhere in the country when, 
in his were needed to strengthen South Vietnamese forces." The 
number of American forces rose precipitously. At the opening of 1965, 23,000 U.S. 
troops were in Vietnam. One year later the number soared to troops.49 
In Westmoreland outlined his of operations which noted 
that the "insurgency in South Vietnam must eventually be defeated among 
in the hamlets and towns."The MACV Commander went on to speak 
of security-from "large, well and equipped forces" and 
from "the the the terrorist and the informer."50 The population 
thus had to be secured from both insurgents and military formations. 
Westmoreland likened the political subversives to "termites" which were eating 
away at the foundation of the Saigon Concurrently, main force 
or "waited for the opportune moment to strike at the weakened 
structure with crowbars. As Westmoreland recalled, if the Americans and their 
South Vietnamese allies were to be successful, "Neither facet could be ignored."51 
Westmoreland's analogy of termites and bully be dismissed as 
simplistic, but evidence supports the argument that the general realized attrition 
main force units could not be achieved at the expense of pacification or 
counterinsurgency. The opposite also held true. Westmoreland could not conduct 
insurgents while ignoring the conventional threat. All the 
American forces needed to aid their South Vietnamese allies in pacifying 
and provide some sense of security to the rural population. 
Westmoreland used the word "attrition'' in both his memoirs and in his 
uvic;u.•~'-"-" with senior and subordinate commanders. Such communications, 
suggest the general was focused less on killing the enemy and more on 
U"'-U"''~"''H"" to those directing the war effort that the conflict in Vietnam would not 
be concluded Attrition emphasized that the war would be prolonged. As 
Westmoreland wrote to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1965, 
"the behind whatever further actions we may undertake ... must be that 
Office, 1992-2006): 2:733-34 (hereafter cited as FRUS). See also Graham A. Cosmas, 
MACV: The joint Command in the Years 1962-1967 (Washington: Center 
2006), 203; and John Prados, Vietnam: The History ef an Unwinnable War, 
University Press of Kansas, 2009), 116. 
49. Herbert Y. Schandler, The ef a President: Johnson and Vietnam 
t'nncc~to1:i, N .J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 27. Troop numbers in Schulzinger,A Time 
for War, 183. 
50. Westmoreland, "Concept of Operations-Force Requirements and Deployments, 
South Vietnam," 14 June 1965, Folder 04, Box 02, Larry Berman Collection (Presidential Ar-
chives Research), Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas (hereafter cited as 
51. Westmoreland,A Soldier Reports, 175. 
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This struggle has become a war of attrition .... I see no 
favorable end to the war."52 
so in the war, reveals a commander 
enemy forces and more concerned about the 
power of his own armed forces and nation. He the comtJlex1ty 
of his task. As his chief intelligence officer 
battle but three to 
to develop the 
and protect the peasants in the South Vietnamese 
the threat and the mission a broad of the ~~0~n-h~.~ 0 
word like attrition could not characterize 
fighting in South Vietnam caused immense articulation. 
The lexicon of the was unsuited to Westmoreland's manifold tasks. 
Lacking precise terminology to describe the three battles MACV uHUU.U<t-Uv•uu.oi 
any broad strategic concept came with the risk of ambiguity. If attrition 
forces had been the guiding light of American in one 
might expect more certainty among the senior leaders. Westmoreland's 
panoptic strategy, however, left many American field commanders in doubt as to 
how their units would achieve such far-reaching objectives. 
The tasks associated with Westmoreland's expansive strategic concept-what 
he would call a "three-phase sustained campaign''-reflected an army willing to 
learn about and adapt to the unconventional environment of South Vietnam. 
Phase I visualized the commitment of U.S. and allied forces "necessary to halt the 
losing trend by 1965." Tasks included securing major military bases, ae1-en1:1mg 
major political and population centers, and preserving and strengthening South 
Vietnam's armed forces. In Phase II, Westmoreland sought to resume the offensive 
to "destroy enemy forces" and reinstitute "rural construction activities." In this 
phase, aimed to begin in 1966, American forces would "participate in clearing, 
securing, reserve reaction and offensive operations as required to support and 
sustain the resumption of pacification."Finally, in Phase oversee 
the "defeat and destruction of the remaining enemy forces and base areas." It is 
important to note here that Westmoreland's official report on the war included the 
term "sustained campaign."54 The general was under no illusions that U.S. forces 
were engaged in a conventional war of annihilation aimed at rapid destruction of 
the enemy. Attrition suggested that a stable South Vietnam, capable of resisting 
52. Westmoreland to Wheeler, cable, 24 June 1965, Historian's Files, US 
1965-1975, CMH. Westmoreland describes a "war of attrition" in A Soldier Reports, 185. 
53. Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War, The 1946-1975 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio 
Press, 1988), 354. 
54. U. S. Grant Sharp and William C. Westmoreland, Report on the War in Vietnam (Wash-
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 100. Command History, United States 
Assistance Command, 1965, pp. 141-43, Entry Box 2, RG 472, National Archives 
and Records Administration, College Park, 4:296. 
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the and pressures of both internal and external aggressors, would 
not arise in a matter of months or even a few years. 
Nor should Westmoreland's use of the word "attrition" validate assertions that 
the American strategy in Vietnam was singularly focused. In fact, it seems 
tJH•'-"~'U-'"''"' to argue that MACV's commander formulated a "one war" approach 
without using the label later popularized by his successor. Abrams understood 
the interrelationships of war in but so too did 
fundamental issue is the question of the coordination 
of mission activities in Saigon," the 1966. "It is abundantly 
clear that all programs must be 
+-t>nr.-.,,~,,.r1 in order to attain any kind of success in a country which has 
been weakened prolonged conflict and is under increasing pressure 
military and subversive forces."55 Far from being an officer unwilling to learn 
about unconventional warfare, Westmoreland thoughtfully considered the issues 
of land reform, improving the South Vietnamese armed forces, limiting civilian 
.... a.,,uou.u...,0, and facilitating population security in the countryside.56 
The implementation of such an all-encompassing strategy would have been 
exceedingly difficult for any Army. Unsurprisingly, American commanders found 
it nearly impossible to translate military success into political progress. Military 
operations often caused depopulation in the countryside, contradicting goals 
of developing a sense of political stability among the people. Tactical successes 
oftentimes achieved temporary results. Not all unit commanders embraced 
the ideals support and governmental reform as necessary ingredients 
for overall success. These failures in implementation, however, did not result 
from whole cloth resistance to learn on the part of the Army.57 From a strategic 
!JL-J.01-1.__,._.,uv•v, Westmoreland's concept of operations indicated a willingness to 
the behavior. MACV's strategy actually mirrored conceptual 
insights derived from Army doctrine and professional journals. So too did unit 
.,...,.,""''''"..-.'"'"".-'+-on the extended political-military battlefields of South Vietnam. 
·""'''""~"" on a Convoluted Battlefield 
In the early 1960s, the U.S. Army component serving in Vietnam gradually 
transformed from an advisory role to an active participant in the war. The 
incremental change required a reorientation away from conventional, if not 
operations and tactics to an emphasis on area coverage, reconnaissance, 
and population security. Critics argue that "the did not change orientation 
55. Westmoreland to Collins, cable MAC 0117, 7 January 1966, Pacification Overview/ 
Conclusions Folder, Historian's Files, CMH. 
56. Cosmas, MA.CV, 140. 
57. On general difficulties with implementation, see Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla A. 
and Arnold Canter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 2d ed. (Washington: Brook-
ings Institution Press, 2006), 251. 
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to the fundamentally new tasks of Even when the 
did innovate, such as adjusting airmobile tactics for use in a counterinsurgent role, 
commentators saw little more than helicopters "rattle-assing around."59 A more 
analytical approach of what the Army did on a basis, reveals an 
organization far more open to shifting operational perspectives. When employing 
their units in South Vietnam, commanders consciously readjusted their approaches 
to decision-making and action. Divisional units, operating across the mosaic 
of South Vietnam's diverse provinces, actively chose to reframe their ideas on 
fighting in an unconventional environment. 
The 1st Cavalry Division perhaps best exemplified both the potential and 
problems of learning and innovating in Vietnam. Conducting operations in the 
Central Highlands, the 1st Cavalry deployed to Southeast Asia as the Army's first 
airmobile division in August 1965. Less than three months later, elements of the 
division fought a fierce battle against North Vietnamese regulars in the western 
highlands' la Drang valley. Westmoreland deemed it an "unprecedented victory" 
by highlighting the 634 dead NVA soldiers and a further 1,215 "estimated" enemy 
killed in action. Historians subsequently have pointed to this first full-fledged battle 
as an action which inhibited learning since it validated the Army's conventional 
concept of warfare. As Andrew Krepinevich has maintained, "Standard operations 
were working; therefore, no alternative strategies needed to be explored. No more 
feedback was required for MACV save the body counts that measured the attrition 
strategy's progress."60 
The 1st Cavalry, however, did explore ways to increase its effectiveness in 
the aftermath of the la Drang battles. A review of the division's OR/LLs in 
1965 and 1966 reveals an organization willing to experiment and reflect on its 
operational practices. After-action reports discussed how the conduct of military 
operations in inhabited areas "where VC and innocent women and children are 
intermingled continues to be a problem." (Even before la Drang Westmoreland 
was instructing commanders to use "utmost discretion and restraint" so as not to 
cause noncombatant casualties.)61 Other1st Cavalry reports noted the difficulties 
of coordinating artillery and ground fire with the entirely new concept of airmobile 
operations, the complexities of which are too often overlooked in many histories. 
58. Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy, 31. On reorientation, see Vetock, Lessons 
Learned, 97. 
59. Malcolm W. Browne, The New Face efVl!ar, rev. ed. (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1968), 78. 
60. Krepinevich, The and Vietnam, 169. Westmoreland quoted in "Westmoreland 
Surveys Action," New York Times, 20 November 1965. Assessment of Ia Drang body counts in 
Daddis, No Sure Victory, 80. 
61. Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division, "Lessons Learned, 1 Oct-30 Nov 65," p. 3, Box 
1, Operational Report/Lessons Learned, 1st Cavalry Division, MACV Command Historian's 
Collection, MHI. Gen. Westmoreland to Gen. Wheeler, cable, 28August1965, R.O.E.Jul-Sep 
1965 folder, Box 5, Miles Papers, MHI. 
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the division's OR/LL was --u~•,u.uu""' lessons related to civil November 
construction "'"'' 1 "' 0 t- 0 and That month the 1st 
the purpose of which was to "build 
re1at1onshJLP with the local enhance _,_,,._...,...,-'-"-''H~-" ~-ni-h·=,...,~,~ 
local VC back into the Government of Vietnam control." 
missions. 62 
that most divisions 
the division found its tactical submitted in advance to 
co1norormsed. Intelligence collection on the NLF -'-"-"'U.L'"'"-'-'" 
after of the difficulties 
-'-"-'·'"'-'-'--'-""'''ii'-" gained from the civilian population, 1st 
of local Vietnamese sources questionable. 63 
these challenges, the 1st reflected on its and 
"'"''"',..,..,..,"' ..... t-"ri with new ideas. The division found "saturation patrolling," which 
included both and night to be an effective means of hindering VC 
actlv1t1es in areas. It also employed "mobile interrogation teams" to 
conduct interviews with the local populace in of improving its intelligence 
64 In the division's 1st Brigade launched Rolling 
what it considered to be a "classic counterinsurgency operation in the 
Stone the interrelated fields of 
r-s1rcn.oHJg1ca1 Warfare and Ground Combat Operations." While 
r.nPr.,,f-1r•n resulted in 142 enemy dead, it also illustrated limitations with the 
Jpn~rh-nP••t- of the Division 
HHHV•JHL·;," 28 November 1966, p. 31, Box 1, Up1era,t10na1 
Division, MACV Command Historian's Collection, MHL Operation Jim Bowie report in 
,_,=~.--.'"M,..,.,,,.0 1st Division, "Combat After Action Report," 8 1966, ibid. 
1st Division, "Lessons Learned," 15 March 1966, Box 1, Op-
Learned, 1st Command Historian's Collec-
Learned," 17 June 1966, ibid. On problems assimilat-
ing to warfare, see Shelby L. Stanton, The Rise U.S. Ground 
Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973 (Novato, Calif: Presidio Press, 1985), 87. 
64. 1st Infantry Division, Report-Lessons Learned," 1 
31 1966, pp. 23-25, 1st Infantry Division File, Documents, Historian's Files, 
CMH. 
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Army's effectiveness in Vietnam's environment. 
Rolling Stone did little to dislodge NLF forces from Binh Doung province. More 
significantly, the 1st Division failed to increase the level oJ 
popular support for the Saigon government. Even imDr<)ve:C1 
could achieve only so much in a war for the allegiance of the civilian population. 
This contest for control of the Vietnamese population extended to tht 
southernmost portions of the war-torn country. In the fertile and heavily populatec 
Mekong Delta, the 9th Infantry Division began operations in early 196 7. The delt:: 
consisted of a vast network of waterways, rivers, and tributaries posing 
problems for the arrived division. earlier French ir 
riverine operations, the MACV staff formulated an innovative to creat( 
a Mobile Riverine Force. For the first time since the American Civil the 
U.S. Army began using an amphibious river force operating afloat. 61 
"Lessons learned" reports discussed issues in coordinating U.S. and Vietnames< 
navy assets, integrating helicopters into riverine assault operations, and 
troops regularly to prevent immersion foot and skin infections. The riverine fore< 
even designed and constructed six barges capable of carrying 105mm howitzers t< 
provide artillery support for the division's waterborne forces. "Patrol and .. H~'~"~"' 
operations" became a mainstay of the riverine force in an attempt to disrupt enem~ 
traffic along the delta's spider web of waterways.67 
Far from focusing solely on tactical issues, the 9th Infantry leadership workec 
to integrate combat operations with pacification efforts. The division staff utilize< 
Hamlet Evaluation Survey (HES) data, designed to gauge progress in pacificatior 
to coordinate combat missions with their own civic action and South Vietnames1 
programs. The 9th also instituted an Integrated Civic Action Program 
to "collect information on the enemy while providing humanitarian assistano 
and attempting to improve GVN [Government of South Vietnam] acceptanc 
in local hamlets [and] villages."68 As with other American programs, the result 
were debatable. Division commander Major General Julian J. Ewell was an activ 
proponent of kill ratios as a measure of success, even earning the nickname "th 
Butcher of the Mekong Delta." Thus it was no surprise when John Paul 
65. Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, "Combat Operations After Actio 
Report," 28 March 1966, Folder 58, Box 1, William E. LeGro Collection, TTUVA. 
66. Shelby L. Stanton, Vietnam Order to U.S. Arm 
Combat and Forces in Vietnam, 1961-1973 (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2003 
77. The challenge was in surprising the enemy since often knew riverine forces were 
67. Headquarters, MACV, "Combat Experiences 3-69," Section III, MHI. Headquarter 
Department of the Pamphlet No. 350-15-10, Operations-Lessons Learned, 
1968, Appendix V, MHI. Ira A. Hunt, Jr., The in Vietnam: 
and University Press 
68. Hunt, 9th Infantry Di'7.1ision, 86, 90. See also Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division, 
erational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 January 1969," 15 Februar 
1969, p. 29, Box 2, Operational Report/Lessons Learned, 9th Infantry Division, MACV Corr 
mand Historian's Collection, MHI. 
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~ i;,~~r,,_,r,,.., civilians in 
\..VUHL'-'J.1-H'J'-''·" .. L-'-''"" to pacification efforts. 
less than 50 percent 
. , .. ,. .... _ .. ,.,were under government 
µ,. ... hr•-nc lea.rrnmg had its limits when it came to effectiveness. 
Tactical revisions made in the aftermath of the countrywide 
1968 Tet offensive emulated those in the 9th Division. Among the more 
contentious debates in the war's historiography, the of how much American 
ch:an~!ed after Abrams took command of MACV in 
,i, 0 ,.-..,,+ 0 n for some time. Lewis Sorley, a strident Abrams 
riri1'Yl,,.,,,. contends there was "a dramatic shift in of the nature and conduct 
of the war, in the measure of and the tactics to be applied." 
Andrew argues persuasively that Abrams's "differed from 
activities more in emphasis than in substance. The key point 
here is that most all of MAC V's officers realized the war itself was changing in the 
aftermath ofTet. Forced to recover from the high casualties sustained in early and 
NVA and NLF forces altered their tactics to avoid allied advantages 
in firepower. more importantly, American goals shifted with the decision to 
"Vietnamize" the war and withdraw U.S. forces from Vietnam. 
Abrams thus confronted a shifting external environment which forced changes 
upon MACV's if not entire approach to the war. To support President 
Richard M. Nixon's of Vietnamization, in which the South Vietnamese 
once again shouldered the entire war effort as the Americans departed, Abrams 
concentrated on training supporting pacification, and continuing offensive 
~~P¥r • .-.r,~ 0 against the enemy. In the process, MACV adapted to its new operating 
environment. Abrams spoke of the challenges "of continuing progress towards total 
Vietnamization in a climate of declining U.S. resources, competing demands on 
RVNAF [South Vietnam's Armed Forces], and limited time."71 As Nixon ordered 
incursions into Laos and Cambodia in 1970 and 1971 to forestall future enemy 
offensives, Westmoreland, now the Army's chief of staff, asked Abrams for a "review 
of the lessons learned" from these operations that might "facilitate improvements 
and doctrine."72 Even with the war winding down, officers like 
VV1::stmc)relarte1 understood the importance of reflection and objective review. 
to understanding wartime Army learning is the diversified nature of the 
American experience in Vietnam. Both Westmoreland and Abrams realized their 
limited to control and influence U.S. forces operating across the breadth of 
69. Daddis, No Sure Victory, 165. 
70. Sorley, A Better War, 17. Birtle, US. Army and Contingency Operations 
Doctrine, 367. 
71. Gen. Abrams to Gen. Clay, cable, 5July1971, Abrams Messages #10163, CMH. Head-
quarters, MACV, "One War: MACV Command Overview, 1968-1972," pp. 2-17 to 2-18, His-
torian's Files, CMH. 
72. Gen. Westmoreland to Gen. Abrams, cable, 7 April 1971, Abrams Messages #9870, 
CMH. 
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South Vietnam. As General William E. 
that there were several levels of war going on simultaneously, all the way from 
the very quiet subversive war and war of terror down in the hamlets 
and villages, all the way up to the main forces and everything in between."73 
The level of organizational learning consequently on those unit 
commanders operating in the distributed, decentralized environment of Vietnam. 
Unsurprisingly, the quality ofleadership, and thus learning, varied from 
to province. The temperament of commanders became a crucial factor in both 
learning and adaptation. As one senior officer "Some were sensitive 
to community relations and the political, economic, impact of 
military operations on attainment of US objectives whereas less sensitive, 
failed to recognize that military operations could progress in winning 
support of the people."74 
,,n,rn1""" and 
Support of Vietnamese people constituted -a vital element of MACV 
strategy from the very beginning. Both Westmoreland and Abrams understood 
the importance and difficulties of linking the local population to the central 
government in Saigon. Both pursued attrition and pacification simultaneously. 
In fact, even before Westmoreland took command of "lessons learned" 
reports spoke of "clear and hold" operations which were conducted "in direct 
support of province rehabilitation with the mission of clearing and denying an 
area to the enemy."75 At no time during the war did in balancing military 
operations with the pacification effort, fully embrace one mission to the exclusion 
of the other. Changes in emphasis certainly did occur over time, and in 196 7 
MACV even carried out a significant organizational restructuring to meet the 
needs of pacification. 
Mobilizing popular support for the Saigon government remained a frustrating 
aspect of American strategy in 1965 and 1966. By early 1966 Washington officials 
could no longer ignore the inadequacy of governmental coordination in achieving 
the goals of pacification. Confusion reigned over who was responsible for the 
growing number of military and civilian agencies operating inside South Vietnam: 
MACV, the Agency for International Development (USAID), the United States 
Information Agency (USIA), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). As one 
73. William E. DePuy, interview by Bill Mullen and Les Brownlee, 26 March 1979, p. 
11, Box 1, Oral History, William E. DePuy Papers, MHI. On limited command influence, see 
Spector, After Tet, 216. 
7 4. Willard Pearson in memorandum for W. C. Westmoreland, "Post Mortem on Vietnam 
Strategy," 6 September 1968, p. 4, US Strategy, Vietnam 1965-75, Historian's Files, CMH. See 
also Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: 1he American Struggle for Vietnam'.> Hearts and Minds (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), 222. 
75. Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, "Lessons Learned 
Number 35: Clear and Hold Operations," 10January1964, Gen. Westmoreland Reading File-
Jan. 1964, Box 1, Miles Papers, MHI. 
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"''h,,.rh 1 is wandering around without any clear-cut direction and 
m<m<Jlgeme:nt. "76 In March Army staff published a on the war titled 
for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam." 
PROVN for the report charged that "interagency within the 
American mission in Vietnam was a major obstacle hindering the achievement 
of U.S. 77 Westmoreland tracked along similar lines, placing command 
on revolutionary development and civic action programs and noting 
in his strategic for 196 7 that the effort should "properly 
dovetail the and civil programs."78 
With pressure for from the White a 
reluctant U.S. in Saigon created the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) 
in November 1966. embassy officials feared that OCO would lead to a 
of civilian programs-Westmoreland supported MACV serving as 
mr•r>nrrP.·.-" for pacification-the new office directly improved supervision 
of the effort's civil side. 79 OCO unified interagency direction and 
created a pacification chain of command from Saigon to the countryside's districts 
and Senior officials working on pacification, from the CIA to USAID, 
now worked together in a central location, facilitating planning and coordination. 
OCO now managed refugee programs, revolutionary development cadre training, 
osivcnLOl<)fllCal operations, and public safety planning. The military side of pacification, 
h"''"'""" .. remained outside of OCO's purlieus. Thus, while the office served as the 
first full step towards a new pacification organization, the "other war" remained 
set)ar:ated from those military operations being conducted MACV. Less than six 
months later, American officials, citing a visible lack of improvement in the field, 
dismantled OCO and incorporated it into a new organization. 80 
.LJ•~"L'-'.L\- its size, OCO simply did not have the resources to implement the 
programs for which it provided oversight. Westmoreland's strategic concept for 
considering more than just attrition of enemy forces, left OCO increasingly 
unable to cope with the coordination of civil and military efforts. Westmoreland 
76. Colonel Wilson quoted in Robert W. Komer, "New 
J'a1:iftcatum Program-1966-1969 (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 1970), 17. 
77. PROVN report in FRUS, 1964-1968, 4:596. See also Andrew J. Birtle, "PROVN, 
VVc:strno1:ela.nd, and the Historians: A Reappraisal, 72, no. 4 (October 
1213-47. 
78. For Westmoreland's views, see "Command Emphasis on Revolutionary Development/ 
Civic Action " 22 October 1966, in Lester, 1he Papers of William C. Westmoreland, 
text-fiche, Reel 7, Folder 10, 18-29 October 1966; "Strategic Guidelines for 1967 in Vietnam," 
14December1966, Reel 18, CSA Statements Folder, October-December 1966; and 
and \i\Testmoreland, Report on the War in Vietnam, 132. 
79. On the single manager concept, see Cosmas, MA.CV, 357. Embassy fears in George C. Her-
The Second Indochina War, 131. 
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University ofTexas Press, 1994), 77-78. 
l:'aiT/u·atzon, 82-84; Thomas W. Scoville, Reorganizingfor Paci-
Center of Military History, 1999), 44-46; and Schlight, 
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Lyndon B.Johnson Austin, Texas] 
recalled that as "the American effort expanded, so did the programs 
managed by AID, and USIA, so that in time all were competing for 
resources and scarce South Vietnamese manpower."81 The problem 
large and complex for OCO to handle alone. If OCO did not have the '--'H-'"-Ll.l.LLU.'-'C 
or resources to support pacification, it increasingly became clear that 
component of the U.S. mission in Vietnam did have such means.82 
On 9 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson made MACV the 
manager" of pacification in South Vietnam. The president appointed Robert W 
Komer, a longtime CIA analyst and National Council staff ""-'""J'-'L· 
as Westmoreland's deputy for pacification. As Johnson declared, this "new 
organizational arrangement represents an unprecedented melding of civil and 
military responsibilities to meet the overriding requirements of Viet Nam."83 
Holding ambassadorial rank, Komer assumed control of the newly created Office 
of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) and 
reported directly to Westmoreland. The new CORDS chief was not an advisor or 
coordinator but rather held broad authority to manage the American pacification 
effort. Every program relating to pacification, whether civil or military, now fell 
81. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 255. On inability of a civilian-led program to cope, see 
Dale Andrade and James H. Willbanks, "CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from 
Vietnam for the Future," Military Review 86, no. 2 (March-April 2006): 12. 
82. Cosmas, l\!IACV, 354. Scoville, Support, 54. 
83. National Security Action Memorandum No. 362, 9 1967, in FRUS, 1964-1968, 
5:398. 
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under the of Komer and his office. As Westmoreland it was 
arr·ange1nent, a civilian heading a staff section with a general 
and a similar pattern of organization was to follow down the chain of 
command. the president's "single manager" concept guided reorganization 
at every level of the U.S. effort in South Vietnam.84 
Unlike its CORDS incorporated civilians into the military chain 
of command. former OCO staff director, a civilian, headed the CORDS office 
in MACV while a brigadier general served as his deputy. (Komer even received 
n•'1rhr,,,. .. ,, for civilians to write performance on military personnel.) The main 
CORDS more traditional staff sections like intelligence 
oversaw a wide venue of programs. To make the transition 
Komer maintained the six field program divisions established under OCO. 
His reach over pacification programs, however, expanded greatly. "Personnel," Komer 
"were drawn from all the military services, and from State, AID, CIA, USIA, 
and the White House."85 CORDS assumed responsibility for coordinating rural 
development programs, conducting village and hamlet administrative training, and 
overseeing agricultural affairs and public works projects. The integrated, interagency 
office handled research and development planning, wrote MACV policy directives 
on and advised military commanders on civic action programs. Komer 
even assumed the of training and equipping South Vietnamese regional and 
"""""'"""forces to provide local security for pacification programs.86 
It was here, at the local level, that Komer sought to address the fundamental 
onm1errts of pacification support through reorganization. The new ambassador 
ass1gr1ed each of MACV's corps headquarters a deputy for CORDS, usually a 
who outranked the corps commander's chief of staff. Similarly, Komer 
nnr.A1 rd-prl an advisor to each of South Vietnam's forty-four provinces. Illustrating 
the collaborative approach of CO RDS, twenty-five provincial advisors were military 
~,,.· .. 0 r ...... .-.,, •• the other nineteen, civilians. These province teams reported directly to 
the corps deputies while coordinating local military operations with the entire 
array of pacification programs. 87 The sheer breadth of pacification requirements, 
84. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 260. "Single manager" concept in Komer, Organiza-
tion if the "New Model" Pacification Program, 55. For background on Komer, 
see Frank L.Jones, "Blowtorch: Robert Komer and the Making of Vietnam Pacification Policy," 
Parameters 35, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 103-18. On CORDS responsibilities, see Hunt, Pacifica-
tion, 89-90. 
85. R. W. Komer, Does Its 7hing: Institutional Comtraints on U.S.-GVN Per-
in Vietnam (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 1972), 115. On CORDS staff, see Scoville, 
66-67; and Cosmas, MACV, 361. 
86. CORDS programs in Schlight, 7he Second Indochina War, 133; and Hunt, Pacification, 
90-94. 
87. organization in Hunt, Pacification, 94. Civilian and military advisor numbers in 
Chester L. Cooper et al., "The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam, Volume III: 
of Pacification," March 1972, p. 271, Folder 65, U.S. Marine Corps History Division, 
Vietnam War Documents Collection, TTUVA. 
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nowe:ver. strained the of Americans in the field. coul1 
accomplish so much. One American advising a South Vietnames 
infantry division, noted the extent of effort pacification. Once unit 
had established security, they then had to "determine the people's needs, act a 
a link between the higher governmental agencies and the people, see that th 
needs were met, inform the people, hamlet self-governmeff 
assist the people in agricultural and economic development, establish intelligenc 
nets, detect and eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure, and restor 
the legitimate government in the hamlet."88 Establishing a "single manager" fo 
pacification surely made sense, but coordinating the vast number of program 
under that manager proved extraordinarily difficult. 
Still, the chief contribution of CORDS was to pull pacification's numerou 
activities under one centralized command. At its CORDS employe< 
roughly 5,500 officials to support its wide range of programs. External pressUft 
to reform certainly encouraged the reorganization process. So too, howeve: 
did the support of William Westmoreland. The MACV commander gracefull: 
endorsed· an arrangement which made few distinctions between civilian am 
military officials and backed Komer's ambitions of enlarging the role CORD~ 
played in local population security. As Westmoreland recalled, "Who headed th1 
program at each level depended upon the best man available, not whether h1 
was military or civilian."89 MAC V's commander committed himself to facilitatin! 
the implementation of CORDS rather than serving as an obstacle. If CORD~ 
represented the single most important managerial innovation during the Vietnan 
War, Westmoreland's support played a decisive role in the organization's inceptio1 
and survival. 90 
Conclusions-When Learning May Not Matter 
CORDS certainly streamlined the process of pacification for MACV bu 
Westmoreland's (and Abrams's) strategy still required resolving a wide range o 
military, political, economic, and social problems. Too often in South Vietnarr 
military operations worked at cross-purposes with pacification. Success in om 
area did not equate to advances in the other. In truth, CORDS, like so many o 
the U.S. Army's programs, never came to grips with the underlying problems o 
the war inside South Vietnam. This crucial point suggests that one aspect of th( 
war's historiography is, in a sense, flawed. A reexamination of the U.S. 
strategic approach, operational experiences, and organizational changes reveal~ 
that learning did occur during the nearly decade-long struggle in South Vietnam 
88. John H. Cushman, "Pacification: Concepts Developed in the Field by the RVN 21s 
Infantry Division, 16, no. 3 (March 1966): 26. While Cushman's experiences pre-datec 
CORDS, the requirements of pacification had not changed between 1966 and 1967. 
89. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 260. Numbers of officials in CORDS from Herring 
LBJ and Vietnam, 81. 
90. Douglas S. Blaufarb, 7he Era: U.S. Doctrine 1950 t1 
Present (New York: Free Press, 1977), 240. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam, 64. 
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constrained and 
not solve fundamental weaknesses of the 
chasm between the Vietnamese and their 
success, whether in combat or civic 
",,.,,,,.,,....,.,,..,..for the GVN. 
P-v1"'"'"''""'rP in Vietnam indicates that 
can learn and still lose. Even with institutional learning, 
can elude leaders committed to changing their organization's behavior based 
on observations and experiences. 93 of success and failure was a 
,..,.,.,..,,.....,.i,,,,, .. ".ri affair in Vietnam where there were no front lines to mark progress. In 
it was difficult to learn. Commanders to determine what was most 
1-'...,,,,u . _ ... _.. action frequently trumped 
and how to make sense of an complex conflict. As one 
~~.,"~··~~·~·"In no other war have we been deluged by so many 
H., . ...,_..UH<U'J"' for we have been accustomed to an orderliness associated 
with established battle-lines."94 Still, neither a devotion to conventional warfare 
nor an to understand counterinsurgency prohibited the U.S. from 
learrnmg in Vietnam. As an institution, it reflected on new concepts, 
"'""-1-''"''u'"" .. '""'·'L'-·~ with new ideas, and shared new methods and practices among its 
In the process oflosing a long war, the U.S. had exhibited the traits 
91. Vetock, Lessons Learned, 104. 
92. Bruce Palmer,Jr., The 25-Year Wrr.r:America's Military Role in Vietnam (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1984), 178. See also Phillip B. Davidson, Secrets of the Vietnam Wrr.r (Novato, Calif: 
Presidio Press, 1990), 146. On limits, see James H. Lebovic, The Limits of US. Military 
Vietnam and Iraq (Baltimore, University Press, 2010), 37. 
~"'"''"'""'and foreign policy," 297. 
94. Harris B. Hollis quoted in Thomas C. Thayer, Wrr.r Without Fronts: The American 
ence in Vietnam (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 4. 
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